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The  cash  market  is  the  market  for  overnight  loans between  financial 
institutions.  This market is central to the operation of  Australia's financial 
system:  it is there that banks seek to borrow or lend in response to short- 
term fluctuations in their liquidity, and where the Reserve Bank conducts the 
domestic market operations through which it controls monetary conditions 
and implements monetary policy changes. 
This  paper  outlines  a  model  of  the  cash  market  in  Australia,  which 
incorporates recent changes in  the operating procedures followed by  the 
Reserve Bank.  The paper shows how the dynamics of  the cash market 
depend on the presence of  both same-day and next-day settlement in the 
cash market, and how the various interest rates on overnight loans ("cash 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This note outlines a model of  the Austrahan cash market.  This is the market 
where overnight interest rates are determined and where the Reserve Bank 
conducts its market operations.  An  understanding of  the structure and 
operation  of  this market is  helpful in  analysis of  the  Reserve  Bank's 
implementation of  Australian monetary policy. 
The paper explains the structure of  the market and the determination of 
overnight interest rates (or "cash rates").  The analysis in the paper is based 
on the Reserve Bank's  present approach to monetary policy in which it 
announces a target cash rate and operates to maintain rates close to  the 
announced  target  rate;  however, the  model itself  is equally  useful  in 
analysing the workings of  the cash market prior  to the adoption of  this 
approach in January 1990.1 
There are two parts to the cash market: 
the market for exchange settlement (ES) funds - those funds that can be 
transferred for sarne-day value between accounts at the Reserve Bank and 
used by banks to meet their daily ES  obligations.  Participation in this 
market is  restricted  to  the  Reserve  Bank  and those institutions with 
"same-day"  accounts  at  the  Reserve  Bank:  the  banks  (which have 
exchange settlement accounts) and the  authorised short-term money 
market dealers (which have clearing accounts). Institutions in both groups 
must keep their Reserve Bank accounts in credit at the end of  each day - 
there are no overdrafts permitted -  and the Reserve Bank does not pay 
interest on credit balances. 
Earlier papers have examined the workings of  the cash market at different stages of 
its  development:  see  Macfarlane  (1984)  and  Dotsey  (1991).  A  less  technical 
introduction  to  the cash market can be found in Battellino  (1990) or Reserve Bank  of 
Australia (1990) . The mainstay of  this market is therefore the lending by banks of their 
surplus ES  funds to  authorised  dealers.  Like  all loans to  authorised 
dealers,  these  must  be  secured  (if  secured  with  Commonwealth 
Government securities (CGS), the loans can be counted as PAR assets), 
Banks  also  borrow  and lend  ES  funds between  themselves  on  an 
unsecured basis in the interbank market at a rate of  interest which tends to 
be slightly higher than that on bank-dealer loans, reflecting the lack of 
collateral. 
Both banks and authorised dealers also transact in non-ES funds, both 
with each other and with other non-bank institutions; 
the market for non-ES funds (often called "next-day"  or "bank-cheque" 
funds). This part of  the market deals in funds transferred by cheques paid 
into an account at a commercial bank.  These funds are cleared overnight 
and give  rise  to  ES  obligations  for banks  on the  next  day.  Banks, 
authorised dealers and other non-bank  institutions participate in this 
market. 
The interest rate paid by the authorised dealers on overnight ES  loans from 
banks is called the interest rate on ES  funds.  The interest rate paid by the 
dealers on overnight loans in non-ES funds is the secured non-ES funds rate. 
The weighted average of  these two rates is called the official cash rate. 
The interest rate on unsecured overnight loans of  non-ES funds is called the 
unofficial  cash  rate -  this  is  generally higher  than  either  of  the  two 
components of  the official cash rate, reflecting the lack of  collateral. 
Of  the  two markets,  that  in non-ES  funds is  the larger -  there are no 
statistics collected, but there could be $15 billion or more outstanding at any 
time. The market in ES funds typically has about $2;  billion outstanding. 
The two markets are closely linked.  Banks expecting to  receive inflows 
(respectively pay outflows) of  ES  funds tomorrow can either wait  until 
tomorrow and lend (respectively borrow) in the ES  market then or they can lend (respectively borrow)2 in the non-ES market today to offset tomorrow's 
expected flows.  In the latter case, the banks are using what is called "float" 
-  the amount which spills into the ES  market tomorrow as a result of 
transactions today.  Banks' choice between the two options will be based on 
a number of  factors.  One is a comparison of  the non-ES rate today and the 
expected ES rate tomorrow.  More important is the level of  ES balances that 
each bank has -  if  high, the bank is likely to lend non-ES funds today so as 
to avoid building ES balances up further;  if low, the bank is likely to wait so 
as to build up its ES  balances and lend them in the ES  market tomorrow. 
Indeed, in the latter case, the bank may even seek to borrow non-ES funds 
today to add to its ES surplus tomorrow.3 
Authorised dealers facing a surplus (respectively deficit) today can meet this 
by repaying loans (respectively borrowing) in  either  the  ES  or non-ES 
markets today.  In both cases they will balance their clearing accounts at the 
Reserve Bank, but each will have a different implication for flows of  ES cash 
tomorrow.  The decision will be based on comparing ES  and non-ES interest 
rates today. 
Overall, the linkages between the two parts of  the cash market create a 
dynamic (or intertemporal) effect which is the key to understanding the 
operation of  the cash market as a whole. 
2.  DAILY EQUILIBRIUM 
Although it is the smaller part, it is the ES  funds market which is central to 
an understanding of  the operation of  the overall market.  It is here that the 
In this context, "lend"  should be  taken to include buying securities and "borrow" 
should be  taken  to  include selling securities  (either outright or under repurchase 
agreements). 
3  When a bank (say, Bank A) lends non-ES funds today to a party which is, or banks 
with, another bank (say, Bank  B), it must pay Bank  B  the "float"  interest rate on this 
amount overnight -  as it does on all  uncleared payments.  This normally does not 
affect  the decision  to lend, however, since Bank  A will  receive  the float rate on the 
same amount when the loan is repaid.  The float rate is set each week as the average of 
the official cash rate during that week.  Banks settle for their net float payments each 
month in  arrears -  as this example suggests, the netted payments tend  to be quite 
small given the large flows of  funds that occur through the overnight clearings. Reserve Bank operates, setting the parameters for the cash market as a 
whole. 
Daily equilibrium in the ES funds market requires that the demand for and 
supply of  ES funds to banks and authorised dealers are equated. 
Supply of ES funds to banks comes from: 
an opening surplus of  the banking system -  i.e. the net amount owed by 
the  Reserve  Bank  to other banks on  account  of  the  previous day's 
transactions in non-ES funds involving the Reserve Bank and its banking 
cus  tomers;4 
sales of  currency to  the  Reserve  Bank  (these are usually  small, the 
exceptions being immediately after Christmas and Easter holidays); 
recall by banks of  ES loans made in the past to authorised dealers; 
rediscounts by banks of  CGS at the Reserve Bank. 
It should be noted that, while interbank loans of  same-day funds do exist, 
they can only redistribute the supply between banks and cannot alter the 
supply to banks as a group. 
Sources of  ES funds to authorised dealers are: 
sales of  CGS to the Reserve Bank in its dady operations at about 1030; 
loans from banks transferred in ES funds; 
sales of  CGS to the Reserve Bank under late repurchase arrangements 
after 1450. 
4  This also includes some transactions  in ES  funds which were prearranged -  e.g. 
sales of  foreign exchange to the Reserve Bank  (which would have been  arranged two 
days in advance). Demand by banks stems from: 
an opening deficit of  the system; 
purchases of  currency from the Reserve Bank (these are usually small, the 
exceptions being immediately before Christmas and Easter holidays); 
take-up of  CGS won at tenders but not yet settled; 
placement of  new loans with authorised dealers; 
leaving cash in exchange settlement accounts at the Reserve Bank. 
Demand by authorised dealers stems from: 
purchases of  CGS from the Reserve Bank in its daily operations at 10:30; 
take-up of  CGS won at tenders but not yet settled; 
recall by banks of  past ES loans;5 
leaving cash in clearing accounts at the Reserve Bank. 
Also  relevant  are dealers'  sales and purchases  of  securities,  or loan 
transactions in non-ES funds, with banks and non-banks.6  These sources all 
provide or use non-ES  funds, but are relevant  to the ES  market as the 
Reserve Bank gives authorised dealers same-day value in their  clearing 
accounts for these transactions.  Hence, the authorised dealers can offset a 
potential surplus (respective shortage) of  ES  funds by creating a matching 
shortage (respective surplus) in their transactions in non-ES funds. 
Of  all the uses of ES  funds listed above, the options of  leaving positive 
balances in accounts at the Reserve Bank are rarely used in any significant 
5 Authorised dealers are not permitted to make loans to other parties. 
6  Banks do not lend non-ES funds to dealers directly, but can sell or buy securities 
with them for non-ES payment, including under repurchase agreements. degree,  as  the  Reserve  Bank  pays  zero  interest  on  balances  in  these 
accounts.7 All other uses pay a market return to the owner of  the cash. 
Equilibrium 
Ignoring  the  options  of  leaving  cash  uninvested -  i.e.  in  exchange 
settlement accounts at zero interest -  the equilibrium condition for the 
official market can be represented algebraically for day t by: 
where  St  = net opening surplus of  the market (negative if  deficit) 
0  = net purchases of  CGS by the Reserve Bank in its open market 
operations and late repurchases (excludes unwinding repurchases, 
which are included in St)B 
Rt  = rediscounts of  CGS by banks 
Tbt  = take-up of  newly-issued CGS by banks 
Tdt  = take-up of  newly-issued CGS by authorised dealers 
Lnt  = net new loans to authorised dealers from non-banks 
Bnt  = net sales of  securities by authorised dealers to banks and 
non-banks 
The net opening surplus of  the market itself reflects a number of  factors: 
7  The Reserve Bank can at its discretion accept interest-bearing deposits from banks, 
but these are rarely used. 
8  If  the Reserve Bank conducts. foreign exchange swap transactions in ES funds, they 
would also be included in this term as their effect on the cash market is identical to 
that of  conducting transactions in repurchase agreements using CGS. where  Gt-1  =  net Government deficit on day t-1 arising from budget 
transactions 
Mnt-1 =  maturities of  and interest due on CGS paid to non-banks 
on day t-1 
Mbt  =  maturities of  and interest due on CGS paid to banks 
Mdt  =  maturities of  and interest due on CGS paid to 
au  thorised dealers 
Zt-2  =  net sales of  foreign exchange to the Reserve Bank on 
day t-2 
Nt  =  net sales of  Australian currency to the Reserve Bank 
Udt  =  net repurchases of  CGS by the Reserve Bank as a 
result of  past sales under repurchase agreements (negative if 
resales) 
Lnt-1  =  net new loans in non-ES funds to authorised dealers 
from banks and non-banks on day t-1 
Bntml  =  net sales of securities by authorised dealers to banks and 
non-banks on day t-1 
Those items which appear dated t-1 are paid on day t-1 in non-ES funds and 
affect ES  on day t  after being cleared overnight.  Z is dated t-2 because 
foreign exchange  transactions  are normally  arranged two days before 
settlement, with that settlement being effected in ES funds. 
Substituting (2) into (1) yields: The dynamics of  daily equilibrium arise because of  the presence of  the term 
Lyl+ By-1 in equation (3).  This represents the net flow of  non-ES  cash 
obtained by authorised dealers from banks and non-banks on day t-1, either 
in the form of  new loans or sales of  securities.  This net flow helped to 
balance the sources and  uses of  cash on day t-1, but also spllls over to affect 
the equhbrium of  the cash market on day t. 
Of  the terms in equation (3), Gt.1,  Mnc1, (Mbt  + Mdt),  Udt ,  Zt-2, Nt  and (Lnt.1 + 
Bnt-1)  are all predetermined, so the equation can be written: 
where  Xt  = Gt-1+z-2+  Nt+Mq-I+  (M++Mq  + Udt- (Lq-l+BY-l) 
The intertemporal workings of  equation (4) can best  be  illustrated with a 
simple example. Assume that on day 1  X1,  R1 ,  and Tbl + Tdl  are all zero - 
i.e. the system starts off in balance, there are no rediscounts and there is no 
take-up.  Assume now that the Reserve Bank sells $100 mdlion worth of 
securities to the authorised dealers in its daily operations -  i.e. O1 = -100. 
As  there are no additional ES  funds available, authorised dealers will need 
to choose one of  two options in response: 
raise $100 million in non-ES funds to finance the purchase of  the securities 
from the  Reserve Bank, either by raising new loans of  $100 million  or 
selling securities worth $100 dion  to banks or non-banks.  In either case, 
Ly + By = 100 and  the cash market is in eqydibrium. 
Assume for the moment that this is what the authorised dealers do.  On 
day 2, the spillover term from day 1 is (Ly + By) = 100 and, if all other 
terms in X2, R2 ,  and Tb2 + Td2 are again assumed to be zero, banks will 
have to pay the Reserve Bank $100  million in ES  funds to  settle  their 
overnight  clearances and will  call  back  this  amount  from authorised 
dealers, in turn causing dealers to have to raise another $100 million from non-banks.  If  the Reserve Bank does not purchase securities from the 
dealers to offset this, L?  + B?  will be equal to $100m, and the banks will be 
short $loom on day 3.  The process would repeat on the third day, and so 
on. 
While the process continues, the level of banks' loans to authorised dealers 
will decline by $100 million each day.  This is offset by a combination of 
rises in the level of  dealers' borrowings in non- ES  funds and rises in the 
holdings of  securities by banks or non-banks as dealers seek $100 rmllion 
from non-banks  each day.  The result  would be  upward pressure  on 
interest rates and security yields, which would persist and even intensify 
as the process went on  from day  to day; 
sell  CGS  worth  $100  don  to  the  Reserve  Bank  under  the  late 
repurchase facility. In this case, the value of Ot is reset to zero and the ES 
market is in ewbrium. 
When the late repurchase agreement expires (which couldbe next day), Ot 
will have a  value of  -100  if  the Reserve Bank does not  do any other 
dealing.  Authorised dealers will then have to raise another $100 rmllion 
from non-banks  on that  day,  and the  opening  situation on day t  is 
replicated. 
Hence, use of  the late repurchase facility merely postpones the need for 
other adjustments of the type outlined in the first option. 
Of  course, in practice the Reserve Bank would not allow the adjustment 
process to continue until banks' ES  loans to authorised dealers became too 
low. During ths  process, interest rates on cash and  securities will change as 
demand by and supply from the authorised dealers and banks change from 
day to day (the ways in which this occurs are discussed in some detail in 
Section 3 below). But the Reserve Bank has announced targets for cash rates 
-  in order to keep to that target rate, the Reserve Bank would remove the 
imbalance by stepping in to inject cash through its market operations if  no 
injection occurred from exogenous sources (e.g. from a Government deficit) 
or  from rediscounts  by  banks  (if  cash  rates  rose  to  the  point  where 
rechscounts were cost-effective).  Nevertheless, what this market structure 
does provide is a high degree of  leverage by the Reserve Bank over  the market and hence it ensures that the Bank has the power to move the cash 
market quickly backward or forward, as the case may be,  should there be 
some disturbance to cash rates caused by one of  the exogenous factors in 
e~ation  (4). 
3.  DETERMINATION OF CASH RATES 
In  practice,  the  official  and  unofficial  cash  rates  are  determined 
simultaneously  by  a complex  interplay  of demand and supply for the 
different categories of  cash.  Further, as both ES  and non-ES loans are used 
by market participants to fund holdings of  securities, typically of  fairly short 
maturities,  changes in  demand  for  or  supply of  cash  will  affect  the 
demand/supply balance in markets for these securities.  Yields on these 
securities will be determined simultaneously with cash rates and will, in 
general, reflect expectations about the levels of  cash rates over the term of 
the securities. 
In this section, however, the determination of  cash rates is presented using a 
partial equilibrium approach which brings out the key linkages between the 
different parts of  the market.  It  first outlines the workings of  the unofficial 
cash market and the determination of  the unofficial cash rate.  It then shows 
how the official cash rate is determined, taking the unofficial rate as g-lven. 
The Unofficial Cash Rate 
As indicated by the model in Section 2, it is movements in non-ES loans to 
authorised dealers and the broader market for securities which play the 
pivotal role in the adjustment of  the market in ES  funds to changes in ES 
cash flows.  When the level of  non-ES loans to authorised dealers changes, it 
adds to or subtracts from the  availability  of  non-ES funds in the wider 
unofficial market. 
Under its present operating procedures, the Reserve Bank  announces a 
target level for cash rates.  In practice, it is the unofficial cash rate which is 
targeted by the Bank (though, as explained later, the unofficial and official 
cash rates are about equal).  The unofficial cash rate fluctuates from day to 
day but the Bank acts to keep it fairly close to the announced target.  Market participants will expect the unofficial cash rate to equal the target rate on 
average in the future until a new target is announced. 
Demand for non-ES funds is likely to be highly elastic at the Reserve Bank's 
announced target interest rate.  Above that rate, demand will fall steeply as 
the loan rate approaches the late repurchase rate (at which dealers can 
obtain cash from the  Reserve  Bank) or the rediscount  rate -  the late 
repurchase rate is normally the lower of  the two and in practice is often 
equal to the announced target rate for unofficial cash.  Below the announced 
target rate, demand will rise steeply as participants try to take advantage of 
what they expect to be a temporary low cost of  funds. 
Supply will be positively related to the unofficial cash rate, but it too is likely 
to be fairly elastic in the vicinity of  the announced target rate.  Because 
participants expect rates to remain close to  the target rate, they will be 
willing to lend considerably more for a small rise in returns and, conversely, 
wdl curtail lending quickly if rates were to fall by a small amount. 
Graphcally, this can be represented by: 
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~e In Figure 1, DD'  represents the demand for non-ES loans and SS'  the supply 
of these loans.  Both curves are relatively flat at around F,  the announced 
target interest rate; r* is the late repurchase rate, at which dealers would 
cease to bid in the market for non-ES funds and instead would sell CGS to 
the Reserve Bank under repurchase arrangements to raise cash. 
It should be emphasised that the shapes of  the supply and demand curves 
depend on perceptions in the cash market that the Reserve Bank will take 
action to keep cash rates close to the announced target rate re  and about 
where the Bank will choose to set the late repurchase rate. 
This model can be used to analyse the effect on the unofficial cash rate of  a 
one-off sale of  CGS by the Reserve Bank, as shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2:  The Unofficial Cash Market 
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The sale of  securities by the Reserve Bank causes a rightward shift in the 
demand curve for non-ES loans, from DIDll  to D2D2rf  as authorised dealers 
enter the market to fund the CGS they have bought from the Bank.  The 
equilibrium level of  loans rises from L1e to L2e and the equilibrium unofficial 
cash rate rises from rle  to rze. The next day, the spillover effect discussed in Section 2 would cause the 
demand curve to move right again by L2e - Lle. This process would continue 
from day to day while  the  authorised dealers were substituting non-ES 
funds for ES funds in their stock of  loans. 
It is clear from this analysis that the Reserve Bank would have to sell a large 
amount of  CGS  to  cause  a  significant rise in the  unofficial  cash rate. 
Alternatively, it would have to sell a smaller amount and allow the effects to 
keep sp~lling  over for several days, with the cash rate rising from day to day. 
However, this results from a set of  demand and supply relationships which 
are based on the expectation that the Reserve Bank does not want to move 
the cash rate by a significant amount, but in fact wants to keep it within a 
narrow range.  When the Bank does want the rate to move, it announces a 
new target which causes the curves to reshape, with their elastic segments at 
the new target rate, because the market knows that the Bank will seek to 
manage  the  flows of  ES  funds to  clear  the non-ES market at that rate. 
Indeed, having announced a new target, there may be  very little need in 
practice for the Bank to buy or sell CGS to add pressure for the cash rate to 
move close to the new target. 
The Official Cash Rate 
As noted in Section 2 above, there are few uses for ES  cash in the hands of 
banks which are surplus to their needs for exchange settlement.  Banks can 
use them to make deposits with the Reserve Bank (generally at low or zero 
interest), to purchase notes and coin, to purchase CGS previously won at 
tender but not yet taken up, or to make loans to authorised dealers.  Only the 
last two offer a market return on the funds, and of  those the former is not 
always available. 
Banks are willing to lend their ES funds to authorised dealers at less than the 
unofficial cash rate, for two reasons: 
the presence of a captive market element, reflecting the relative lack of 
opportunities for banks to invest ES  funds; banks' loans to authorised dealers are secured, either by CGS (attracting a 
concessional risk weighting for capital adequacy purposes and included in 
PAR) or other securities. 
The official cash rate is the average rate paid by authorised dealers on all 
their loans.  From an authorised dealer's point of  view, ES loans from banks 
and loans of  non-ES funds from banks or others are very close substitutes - 
both can be used to square the dealer's clearing account. As a result, dealers' 
demand for ES  loans is highly interest-elastic. 
The market for official cash can be represented graphically as follows: 
Figure 3:  The ES Cash Market 
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where  ru  represents the unofficial cash rate 
rd  represents the rediscount rate 
Be  represents the surplus ES available to banks. 
In Figure 3, the SS curve is drawn as vertical at loan rates below rd.  This 
would be the case if there are no CGS previously won at tender by banks but 
not yet taken up.  If  banks have such CGS available to be taken up, they might use some ES  for this purpose if the loan rate falls sufficiently and the 
SS curve may kink to the left at some point. 
To determine the official cash rate, it is necessary to know re, ru  and the 
proportions  of  loans  to  authorised  dealers  in  ES  and  non-ES  funds. 
Generally, the proportion in ES loans is large -  80 per cent is not unusual - 
so the official rate is dominated by the rate in the ES  part of  the market. 
Loans of  ES  funds between banks on the interbank market are generally at a 
rate  slightly higher  than  the  rate  on ES  loans  to  dealers, because  the 
interbank loans are unsecured. 
In Figure 3, the rate on ES  loans will be  re,  which is  less than ru  as the 
demand curve for ES  funds is always below that point.  If  ES  funds are in 
plentiful supply, re  may be considerably below the unofficial cash rate but 
typically the margin is around 10 basis points (0.1 percentage point).  In such 
a state, however, banks which held  high levels of  ES  loans to authorised 
dealers would be much more willing to lend non-ES funds in an attempt to 
run down their ES holdings -  this would tend, in terms of  Figure 1, to shift 
the demand curve for non-ES loans to the left and the supply curve to the 
right.  In the absence of  some offsetting withdrawal of  ES  funds from the 
market the plentiful supply of  ES  funds would  flow through to lower 
unofficial cash rates and the normal margin between official and unofficial 
rates would tend to be restored.  Of  course, if the unofficial rate were to fall 
too far below the Reserve Bank's  announced target rate, the Bank would 
step in to remove ES funds and reverse the process. 
4.  CONCLUSION 
This paper has presented a simple model of  the workings of  the Australian 
cash market, illustrating the key features of  the same-day/next-day nexus 
on which the dynamics of  the market depend and the impact of  changes in 
cash flows on cash rates. 
The model presented here reflects the contemporary structure of  the market 
-  in particular, it embodies the Reserve Bank's  post-January 1990 approach 
of  announcing changes in monetary policy in the form of  new target levels for cash rates.  Under this operating regime, cash rates have generally been 
within quite narrow bands around the announced target rates. 
There are, of  course, some shortcomings of  a simple model like the one 
presented here.  One important one is that the model makes it look too easy 
to keep cash rates at their target levels.  In fact, there have been occasions 
when cash rates have risen sharply above the announced target levels for 
short periods.  The model presented in ths  paper suggests that this would 
occur if there was a very large outflow of  ES  cash but even then the safety 
valves -  the  late  repurchase  facility  for  authorised  dealers  and  the 
rediscount fachty -  should limit the scope for cash rates to rise. 
These safety valves -  indeed, the whole of  the Reserve Bank's intervention 
in the market -  depend on the ready availability of  CGS to sell to the Bank. 
There are times when friction in the market, associated with the existence of 
credit  and dealing limits between  counterparties, makes it difficult  to 
transfer holdings of  securities -  and hence access to cash -  to the parties 
that need it.  Of  course, like all frictional effects, these tend to be short-lived 
and even then the resulting fluctuations in cash rates are of  a smaller order 
of  magrutude than occurred under past operating regimes. 
Another reason why cash rates might move up sharply stems from each 
bank's desire to keep its level of  ES  balances above a minimum "comfort" 
level.  If  ES balances fall to this level, the bank will curtail its non-ES lending 
and begin to borrow non-ES funds in the unofficial market, with the aim of 
building up its ES  levels the next day.  If  the overall level of  ES  balances is 
very low, many banks will be trylng to do this simultaneously and, in terms 
of  Figure I,  the supply curve for non-ES funds will move to the left and the 
demand curve will move to the right -  a sizeable increase in the cash rate is 
likely.  Of  course, this cannot increase the overall level of  ES  balances 
available to banks -  at most, it just changes the distribution between banks 
-  but the resulting increase in the cash rate would be enough to induce the 
Reserve Bank to inject ES so as to return cash rates closer to their announced 
target level.  Initially, this would depress the official cash rate but within a 
few days would also work through to the unofficial rate by reversing the 
shift in the demand and supply curves for non-ES funds. REFERENCES 
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